I r e n e B. T a e u b e r * I n 1925, Japan's people were predominantly agricultural and rural. The birth rate was in the upper thirties; the gross reproduction rate1 was 2.6. Presumably fertility had been higher in the past, for the rates of marriage and childbearing among women were related both to the urbanization of their areas of residence and to the occupations and the educational levels of their husbands. Presumbly fertility would continue to decline slowly along with increasing urbanization, advancing industrialization, and higher educational levels. In fact, eco nomic growth and social change were rapid in the years after the Pacific war, and declines in fertility were even more rapid. In 1955, the birth rate was below 20, while the gross reproduc tion rate was 1.1. The ratio of births to women in the child bearing ages was less than half its level a generation earlier.
The path of this decline in the fertility of the Japanese is difficult to trace empirically or to assess theoretically. The levels of fertility and the data that measure it were alike related to political and economic events. In the years from 1925 to 1937 there were regularities in the changes in fertility and in the developments in statistics. From 1940 to 1950 there were many statistical activities, but publication was limited. In 1955, numerators from vital statistics and denominators from census tabulations permit the computation of age-specific total and marital fertility rates for the women of the prefectures. Thus it is possible to contrast the fertility of the women in the pre fectures in 1925 and in 1955.
The childbearing of the women in 1925 occurred in the tra-ditional Japan of the pre-Manchurian years. The childbearing of the women in 1955 occurred in a period of rapid economic growth after a decade had lessened many of the influences of war. The differences between these two years permit compari sons of the fertility of Japanese women who were separated from each other by a generation. Interpretations of the results of the comparisons in terms of the processes of fertility decline must be cautious, for the actual course of the declines is known only in broad outline, and the course that the decline would have followed in more normal circumstances cannot be deter mined. It is not possible to determine what fertility would have been in 1955 in the absence of war and defeat. Given war and defeat, it is not possible to determine the relation between the actual developments in fertility over the last fifteen years and those that would have occurred if there had been no legaliza tion of abortions. Projections of prewar trends and other manipulations of the data indicate the magnitude of the fluc tuations and the extent and rapidity of the declines in the years from 1949 to 1955, but such projections do not indicate the fertility that would have been expected in the absence of im perial expansion and war. The demographic facts of size and growth in 1925 alone precluded the orderly and slow transfor mations of the population over a period of many decades or even a century or so. They did not determine a specific direc tion of movement for government, economy, migration, or future population growth. The present note involves comparisons of the levels and the differentials in fertility mainly in 1925 and in 1955, with em phasis on the narrowing or the widening of the differences and the shifts in the relations of age and marital status to reproduc tion. The areas that are utilized include prefectures, industrial groupings of prefectures, and rural and urban areas.
A ll Births to A ll W omen
The outstanding fact in the changing fertility of the Japanese over the last generation is decline. The picture is apparent in T h e M ilban k M em oria l F u n d Q uarterly crude birth rates, but the outlines are more incisive in gross reproduction rates and in ratios of births to women in the child bearing ages (Table 1) . Even a postwar baby boom such as that in process in 1947 failed to lift current birth rates to the levels of 1925 except in an occasional prefecture.
The ratios of births to women in the childbearing ages were substantially lower in 1947 than they had been in 1925, Ishikawa alone showing an increase, and that an insignificant one. Percentage declines amounted to less than 10 in eight of the prefectures. Declines of 10 to 19 per cent occurred in 24 prefec tures, declines of 20 per cent or more in 13 prefectures. This, it should be emphasized, is a comparison of fertility ratios for a year of unusual concentration of first births and of births to re-united couples with a normal year in the mid-'twenties. Fur thermore, it is a postwar year prior to the legalization of abor tion and the public health education for planned parenthood through contraception.
For all Japan, the ratio of births to women in 1955 was less than half that in 1925. Decline amounted to less than 45 per cent for five prefectures, to 55 per cent or more for 11. So great were the declines that there was no overlap in the distributions of gross reproduction rates or birth-women ratios for the prefec tures in 1925 and in 1955.
There were major continuities in the relative levels of fertility in the prefectures from the beginning of the census period in 1920 to 1955. Linear correlations of gross reproduction rates in successive census years were above .9 until 1943. The correla tion of the 1943 rates with those for 1947 was .7; the correlation of the 1947 rates with those for 1950 was .6. The correlations were .8 for 1920 and 1935, .9 for 1935 and 1950. Thus there were drastic declines in fertility, but there were also persistent relations in the levels of fertility in the prefec tures at succeeding periods of time. The variations among the prefectures were appreciable in 1925, and they remained appre ciable in 1955. The level of fertility was lowered, but the pre fectures maintained their relative positions with reference to each other. Thus the forces of stability that underlay reproduc tive behavior must have involved institutions and values that specified families and children, but not numbers of children. The altered economic, social, and psychological conditions that were responsible for the altered levels of childbearing must have been nation-wide rather than local; they must have influenced the peoples in remote rural areas as well as those in great cities. However, it does not seem likely that responses of reproductive behavior either to slowly changing or to sharply altered condi tions, values, and aspirations would be uniform among all groups and in all areas.
In general, the initial impact of economic development and urban growth is greatest on those who labor in industry and live in cities. Among the Japanese, it was the people in the great cities who responded first and farthest with delayed mar riages and reduced fertility among the married. By 1925, how ever, the increasing productivity in agriculture, the migrations of rural youth to cities, the extension of school attendance, and other changes were transforming life in the most remote of the villages as in those close to cities. Levels of fertility in the pre fectures in 1925 were measures of the relative participation of the people in the newer segments of the economy and the devel opment in the larger society. In the succeeding years, the quan titative impact of changing conditions on age at marriage and rate of childbearing was greatest in the areas that were most agricultural in ways of working and most traditional in institu tions and values.
In the slowly changing conditions of the years from 1925 to 1935, declines in fertility were roughly proportional to initial levels. There were disturbances in the years when urban peoples fled to the countryside, but on the whole the greater declines of fertility during the war years occurred in the areas where fertil ity remained relatively high. Convergence toward a national level of fertility that characterized all the people was especially pronounced in the years of rapid decline after the war. None the less, the differences among the prefectures that had been so substantial in 1925 and 1935 remained so in 1947 and 1955 . Convergence was in process, but uniformity was not yet an achievement.
The regularities in the responses to altered conditions and values extended not only to the general level of fertility but to the incidence of the lower fertility in the reproductive years of the women. Later ages at marriage reduced the childbearing of younger women and placed the first births of the newly mar ried in higher age groups. Childbearing had never been appro priate among older women, especially those who had achieved the status of mother-in-law. Throughout Japan, the reductions in fertility among the younger and the older women were so pronounced that they seemed to tend toward the elimination of childbearing among women below age 20 or above age 40. The major irregularities among the prefectures involved the extent and the timing of the reductions in fertility among women in the central reproductive years.
The preceding generalizations on the age structures and the age-specific declines in fertility could have been deduced from the developments of the prewar years alone. They remain valid when the time span includes the prewar, the war, and the post war years. In fact, the regularities in decline and the conver gences in levels were greater in the postwar years of rapid de cline than they had been in the prewar years of slow change. The correlations of the amounts of decline in age-specific birth rates and initial levels are given here for the prefectures for The persistent differences among the prefectures in levels of childbearing were associated with the occupational structure of the labor force and the predominance of city versus town or village living. In Table 2 , age-specific birth rates per 1,000 women are given for 1955, the prefectures being grouped accord ing to the proportion of the employed labor force in primary industry. The lowest birth rates at each age were in Group I, which included Tokyo and Osaka prefectures; the highest were in Group VI, which included the most agricultural prefectures in northeast Honshu and southeast Kyushu. In general, in creases in fertility occurred along with increases in the predomi nance of primary industry. This relationship, so apparent in 1955, had also characterized the childbearing of women at each of the earlier census periods. Declines from 1925 to 1955 re duced the range of variation, but the similarities among the prefectures in the amount and the age incidence of the declines were more striking than the differences.
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Sources o f data: References, note to halved the childbearing of those aged 20 to 24. Declines were least among those aged 25 to 29; here altered ages at marriage and altered rates of childbearing minimized declines but altered the relation of the age-specific to the expected completed fer tility of the women. The greatest absolute declines in births oc curred among women aged 30 to 39; relative declines amounted to one-half at ages 30 to 34, three-fourths at ages 35 to 39. Above age 40, childbearing was limited severely. Reductions averaged 85 per cent at ages 40 to 44, 95 per cent at ages 45 to 49.
The preceding analysis of declining fertility has been pre sented exclusively in terms of births to women, a limitation dictated by the availability of data. The intricacies of the changes would have differed somewhat if a comparable analysis had been made for men. Internal and imperial migration, mili tary mobilization, and war produced temporary or permanent deficits of men. However, the altered balance of the sexes has been a minor factor in the declines of the last decade; in so far as there was an influence, the aging of decimated cohorts of men contributed to increasing marriage and increasing fertility among women in the central childbearing years.
The direct evidence for the years from 1952 to 1957 indicates continuously declining age-specific birth rates for men. The rate for the years 1952 and 1957 are given in Table 3 with the percentage changes for this five year period.2
The halving of general fertility from 1925 to 1955, the widely variant declines among the age groups of women, and the con tinuities in relations among the prefectures characterized the total childbearing of women without reference to the legitimacy of the births or the marital status of the women. In order to determine the priorities and interrelations of changing marital status and changing practices of limitation among the married, it is necessary to examine the initial levels and the course of change in the legitimate fertility of married women.
L e g i t i m a t e B i r t h s t o M a r r i e d W o m e n
In 1955, the regularities in the associations of the legitimate fertility of married women with the industrialization of the pre fectures of residence were even greater than those for the total fertility of all women. For each age group of married women, and for all married women aged 15 to 49, the number of legiti mate births per 1,000 women was lowest in the metropolitan prefectures of Tokyo and Osaka, highest in the most agricul tural prefectures (Table 4 ). The relative penetration of the new economy and society was reflected directly in the childbearing of the married. Advancing ages at marriage and family limita tion within marriage were associated rather than independent variables in the reproductive performance of the women in the geographic areas and social-economic groups in 1955.
The overall declines in marital fertility from 1925 to 1955 corresponded closely to those in total fertility except that the amounts of the declines were somewhat smaller. Altered marital status had been a factor, although a minor one, in the declines in the general levels of fertility over the course of this genera tion. However, the changes in marital fertility by age were strikingly different from those in total fertility. For all Japan, there were increases in marital fertility at ages 15 to 19 and 20 to 24. Little significance can be attached to the increases at ages 15 to 19, for the numbers married at these ages in 1955
The Milbank M emorial Fund Quarterly -9 4 .2 -9 5 .6 -9 5 .5 -9 5 .1 -9 3 .4 -9 4 .3 -9 2 .7 -9 2 .1
•Prefectures classified according to the per cent of the employed labor force in primary industry, *> Total births minus illegitimate births, the latter assumed \jo have the same distribution by age o f mother as all births.
Sources o f data: References, note to Table J. were so few that they represented a stringent selection from the general population. In the modal ages of legitimate fertility, roughly ages 20 to 34, the frequency of childbearing was reduced least in the earlier years, most in the later years. Numbers of legitimate births per 1,000 married women either increased or declined slightly for women aged 20 to 24. There was a reduc tion of one-fifth for women aged 25 to 29, a reduction of onehalf for women aged 30 to 34. Relative declines became pro gressively greater with the advancing ages of the women until they amounted to more than ninety per cent for women aged 45 to 49. If married women aged 15 to 19 are ignored, the rate of change increased progressively from small increases or de creases at ages 20 to 24 to the virtual cessation of childbearing at ages over 40. The process was clearly the limitation of higher order births rather than the avoidance or even the substantial postponement of first births.
F ertility in the SHI and the GUN3
In Japan, there were close associations among non agricultural occupations, life in cities, age at marriage, and childbearing among the married. In the years from 1925 to 1937 the highest ages at marriage and the lowest fertility among the married occurred in the six great cities. There were progressive increases in fertility from the cities of 100,000 and over to the lesser cities, the machi, and the mura. At any given time, there were high correlations between the fertility in the shi and the gun of the prefectures.
In the prewar years, the fertility of the women in a given area was related directly to the extent of the dependence of its popu lation on primary industry. These relations, too, persisted in the postwar years. In 1955, fertility was lower in the cities of 200,000 and over than in all shi, and it was lower in the shi than in the gun (Table 5 ). The range in gross reproduction rates 3
The terms shi and gun are often translated as urban and rural. Shi are incor porated municipalities, most of which have populations of 50,000 or more. All the population not in shi live in gun. Thus much of the population that would be con sidered as urban in the United States live in gun, rather than shi.
extended from .85 in the cities of 200,000 and over in the most industrial prefectures to 1.58 in the gun of the most agricultural prefectures. In fact, the fertility of the women in the shi of the most agricultural prefectures was higher than that of the women in the gun of the most industrial prefectures.
Since there were substantial differences in marital status be tween the women of the shi and the gun, the childbearing of women in 1955 is examined separately for total and for married women (Table 6 ). In each industrial grouping of prefectures, the ratio of children below age one to women aged 20 to 34 was lowest in the cities of 200,000 and over, intermediate in the smaller shi, highest in the gun. For any given type of area of residence, fertility was lowest in the most industrial prefectures, highest in the most agricultural prefectures. These relationships held both for the ratios of infants to all women and for the ratios to married women. if there had been major reductions in the frequency of upperorder births among large portions of the families. Information on order of birth is not available for the prewar years, but it is available for the prefectures for the years from 1951 through 1957. In these years there were continuing increases in the proportion of all births that were first births, continuing reduc tions in the proportion that were fourth or higher order births (Table 7) . Again, the changes were occurring in all industrial groupings of prefectures, from metropolitan Tokyo and Osaka to the prefectures most heavily dependent on primary industry.
Declining Fertility of the Japanese The reductions in upper-order births were so rapid that the pro portion of seventh or higher order births in the most agricul tural prefectures in 1957 was little higher than that in Tokyo and Osaka prefectures in 1951.
In most prefectures, the proportion of all births that were first order increased consistently from 1951 to 1957. In the metropolitan prefectures, however, there were fluctuations similar to those of countries where fertility has long been low. First births were relatively less frequent in 1957 than in 1955, while upper order births were relatively more frequent. The changes were slight, for the concentrations of births in the lower orders were greater in 1957 than they had been in 1953.
In the distribution of births by order, as in the other meas ures of fertility, the characteristics of urban and rural popula tions differed according to the extent of the industrialization of the prefectures of residence. In 1953, the proportion of all births that were first or second declined consistently from the most industrial to the most agricultural prefectures, while the proportions of fourth or higher orders increased consistently.4 This was true for the shi and the gun. Differences among the six great cities were slight, but the predominance of lower order births was greater in the large cities than in all shi.
The reductions in the fertility of the Japanese were consistent with the values and the codes of behavior of the family whose primary function was the continuity of the generations. More than fourth-fifths of all first-born legitimate births occurred to women who had been married less than two years. There were some indications of postponement of legitimate first births among women aged 25 to 34, but they were slight. The per centage of all legitimate first births that occurred within two years of marriage are summarized here by the ages of the mothers for recent years:5 4 Numbers of live births by total birth order by age of mother were given for the shi and the gun in the prefectures for 1953. Nihon. Kosei-sho, eisei tokei-bu. Jinko dotai tokei. 1953 Advancing ages at marriage and severely limited childbear ing that began after an initial birth in the early years of mar riage produced an increasing concentration of childbearing within a brief period of married life. In 1957, more than 90 per cent of all legitimate births in Japan occurred to women aged 20 to 34. More than three-fourths occurred to women aged 20 to 34 who were married to men in the same or the next higher quinquennial age group. The major concentrations of legiti mate births were those to women aged 25 to 29. The percentage of all legitimate births occurring to women in this modal age group married to men of the same or the next higher age group increased from 29.6 in 1952 to 34.8 in 1955 and 38.6 in 1957. Thus conformity to modal behavior became increasingly prevalent in Japan during the years of rapid decline in the levels of the fertility.
C o n c l u s i o n s
If an analysis of the declining fertility of the Japanese had ended with the data for the year 1950, there would have been a series of firm conclusions. Fertility had changed slowly in the ways made familiar in analyses for other industrializing coun tries, but the preservation of a stable peasantry had retarded national declines in fertility. Furthermore, this study of the years from 1920 to 1950 would have concluded that war was simply a disturbance to long-run trends, that the major declines in fertility had been and would probably remain those associ ated with changes in rural-urban distribution, occupational composition, and marital status. The anticipations would have involved continuing growth for many decades and very sub stantial multiplications of numbers before demographic transi tion was completed.
If analysis of the declining fertility of the Japanese had been undertaken for the postwar years only, the base line would have been the year 1947. Rates of decline could have been de scribed appropriately as miraculous. No comparable experi ences would have been found elsewhere. The outlook for other Asian countries would have had to involve the possibilities for demographic miracles, for it would have seemed that one had happened in Japan.
The analysis that has been summarized in this paper was made when comparable data were available for the long period of slow change and for the recent period of rapid change. The major technique utilized was the measurement of net change from 1925 to 1955, but there were sustaining analyses of rela tionships in levels of fertility throughout the period and of the form and incidence of the changes in the years from 1951 to 1957.
The substantative results need be summarized only briefly. Fertility declined rapidly over the period from 1925 to 1955. General fertility was reduced fifty per cent, marital fertility forty per cent. Declines extended from the metropolitan areas to the remote villages, and they tended to be greater where the initial level of the fertility was higher. There were conver gences, but they were not sufficient to blur the intricate relations among industrialization, urbanization, and fertility. In 1955, as in 1925, the general and marital fertility of the total popula tion and of its urban and rural components declined progres sively from the most agricultural to the most industrial pre fectures. Relationships at the relatively low levels of 1955 were similar to those at the relatively high levels of 1925.
The net declines in fertility between 1925 and 1955 and the annual changes between 1951 and 1957 alike proceeded in con formity with the changing institutions and the enduring values of Japanese culture. Advancing age at marriage remained the major means for the reconciliation of income, aspirations, and the ideals of family life. Major portions of those who married had a child within two years. Birth rates for married women below age 25 were as high or even higher in 1955 than they had been in 1925. However, in all industrial groupings of prefec tures, and in cities and rural areas within all groupings, there were sharply increasing proportions of first births, sharply de clining proportions of higher order births. There were some evi dences of increasing postponements of initial childbearing, but the evidences were limited, and they were found only in the great metropolitan populations. It was numbers of children rather than the role of marriage, family, and the child in Japa nese culture that had changed.
The net declines in fertility between 1925 and 1955 and the annual declines in recent years are quite consistent with expec tations of declining fertility derived from experience elsewhere. There were extraordinary economic and educational advances in Japan between the early 'twenties and the late 'fifties. The declines in fertility in the 'twenties and the 'thirties could be ascribed primarily to the structural changes involved in urbani zation, industrialization, and marriage postponement. How ever, the rapidly increasing prevalence of urban life and indus trial employment implied massive internal migration, and the continued lower fertility in urban areas and industrial regions meant that people reared as peasants were adopting whatever limitation practices were prevalent in the cities. Internal migra tion joined old and new within a single generation, and migrants formed continuing channels for communication and influence between cities and rural areas.
The plasticity of the reproductive mores of the Japanese was demonstrated early in the reduced and declining fertility of the populations of the great cities. The bases for rapid declines in the fertility of rural people may also be found in the continuing contacts of village people who had moved to cities and those who had remained in the villages.
The major unresolved problems in the declining fertility of
The MUbank Memorial Fund Quarterly the Japanese do not concern either the magnitudes or the asso ciations of the declines that have occurred. They concern the timing of the declines, or, more specifically, the sequence of slow declines over a period of decades and then precipitant declines within a few years. There are two foci for research. One in volves the reasons for the long persistence of relatively high fertility in Japan, and particularly among its literate peasantry. The other involves the reasons for the sudden spread of rigid limitation practices throughout the entire population, and par ticularly the peasantry. The clues to the interpretation of the developments within Japan, and the question of the relevance of these developments to other Asian countries, lie in further analyses of the changing fertility of the agricultural population.
